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EQUAL TREATMENT AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF INEQUALITY
Cheryl L Harris*
"A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing ......
INTRODUCTION

The title of this article owes a great deal to the provocative
questions raised by the "framers", and here I mean the framers of the
conference. Specifically they ask: Do the Constitution'sprotections of
certain freedoms and of equality itself limit what government may do to
secure equal citizenship for all?
To begin, we should ask, to what Constitution do we refer when we
speak of what the Constitution provides? While the answer may seem
obvious, it turns out each of us may have very different things in mind
when we speak of the Constitution. Consider, for example, the views
of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall.
In a controversial and
trenchant critique of the Bicentennial Celebration, Marshall argued
that one of his objections to a bicentennial celebration of the 1787
Constitution was that it was neither the only constitution nor the only
important constitutional moment:
I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever
"fixed" at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom,
foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the framers particularly
profound. To the contrary, the government they devised was
defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war,
My thanks to James Fleming and the organizers of the Conference on the
Constitution and the Good Society for inviting me to participate. My thoughts were
stimulated and enriched by all of the discussions, and in particular by the
contributions of the members of the panel, Peggy Cooper Davis, William Eskridge,
Deborah Rhode and Alex Aleinikoff. My research assistant, Sharmila Lodhia, and
the incredibly resourceful Linda Maisner, research librarian at UCLA School of Law,
are owed special thanks for their patience and assistance. For encouragement and
insightful critical reads, I thank Devon Carbado. The work of Neil Gotanda, Eric
Yamamoto and Kenneth Karst have provided a crucial foundation for this project.
This article would not have been possible without research support from UCLA
School of Law.
1. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose 49 (3d ed.
*

1954).
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and momentous social transformation to attain the system of
constitutional government, and its respect for the individual
freedoms and human rights, that we hold as fundamental today.
When contemporary Americans cite "The Constitution," they
invoke a concept that is vastly different from what the framers
barely began to construct two centuries ago.... While the Union
survived the civil war, the Constitution did not.2
Note that this is not simply an argument about the evolution of
meaning; Justice Marshall is asserting that over time the Constitution
itself has been altered, destroyed and recreated by struggle.
According to Marshall, the post-Civil War Constitution did not simply
expand to incorporate as whole persons those who had previously
appeared only as fractions; the Constitution was itself Reconstructed.
The 1787 Constitution "did not survive" because, in Marshall's view,
the pre-Civil War Constitution was transformed, not only by the texts
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but by the
fierce struggle that radically reshaped the country's political and social
landscape and ultimately, the relationship between the individual
citizen and state and national power. Because Marshall conceived of
constitution- making as engaging people and institutions outside the
courts and legislatures, for him, the Constitution is not a yellowed and
venerated document, but an ongoing and organic text and process,
giving rise to multiple constitutional births worthy of commemoration.
I share this view. The Constitution is more than simply the written
document and more than what the Court says that it means at any
given moment. The Constitution is what we collectively make it
mean. From this vantage point, the most important source of
limitations on government derive not from the Constitution, but from
the imperfect vision with which the people of the nation are endowed.
Of course, the question of whether the constitutional protection of
certain freedoms-and of equality itself-limits the government's
equality-creating efforts hinges on interpretations of the text,
framework and history of the Constitution. Nevertheless, I want to
resist the notion that this can be correctly framed as a decoding
exercise. This is because I am skeptical of the view that constitutional
interpretation can be reduced to merely applying the correct
analytical tools to find meaning "in" the Constitution. Others have
explained why this account of interpretation is incomplete and
misleading. Indeed, in many instances, it may be more accurate to say
that meaning is made, not found.' The text is of obvious importance,
2. Thurgood Marshall, Commentary, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the
United States Constitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2-4 (1987).
3. Sanford Levinson summarizes the debate as follows:
Two classic approaches to understanding a written constitution involve
emphasizing either the allegedly plain words of the text or the certain
meaning to be given those words through historical reconstruction. I think it
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but because, as has often been noted, the text is not self-revealing,4
interpretations of the Constitution depend upon the contentious
question of guiding principles-principles that often appear nowhere
inthe document itself.5 This does not mean that these principles are
non-existent or illegitimate, but it simply reinforces the point that in
the absence of consensus about such principles, it is unlikely that we
will all endorse a singular, superior interpretive tool that will unlock
the hidden meaning in the Constitution.
My approach then assumes a multiplicity of analytical stances and
meanings, each exhibiting various strengths and weaknesses, each
reflecting different principles, perspectives and preferences.
Recognizing that these differences reflect choices allows space to open
around the question of why some choices are being made and how
fair to say that these particular approaches are increasingly without
defenders, at least in the academic legal community.... As Richard Rorty
has pointed out, however, there are at least two options open to critics who
reject the two approaches outlined above but who, nonetheless, remain
interested in interpreting the relevant texts. The first option involves the use
of an allegedly more sophisticated method to extract the true meaning of the
text. [This is a] "weak" textualist [approach] ...Perhaps the best current
example of such a "weak" textualist is John Hart Ely, whose Democracy and
Distrust,... is merely the latest effort to crack the code of the United States
Constitution and discover its true essence.... What unites Ely and most of
his critics, though, is the continued belief that there is something -in" the
Constitution that can be extracted if only we can figure out the best method
to mine its meaning. [In opposition to this view, strong textualists like
Stanley Fish argue] '[i]nterpretation is not the art of construing but the art of
constructing.'
Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373, 378-81 (1982) (citations
omitted).
This is not an entirely new observation or controversy. As Charles Evans Hughes
has famously noted, "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the
judges say it is." Charles Evans Hughes, Speech before Elmira Chamber of
Commerce, May 3, 1907, in Addresses of Charles Evans Hughes, 1906-1916, at 179,
185 (1916).
4. Akhil Amar advances a strong claim for giving primacy to the text but allows
that text will not lead one to clear answers. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court,
1999 Term-Forework The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L Rev. 26, 28
(2000) ("[E]ven after close study the document itself will often be indeterminate over
a wide range of possible applications.").
5. Primary examples include the principles of "separation of powers" and
"federalism." See id. at 30 (noting that "the phrases "'separation of powers'" and
"'checks and balances' appear nowhere in the Constitution, but these organizing
concepts are part of the document, read holistically"). Even vociferous textualists
like Scalia occasionally lapse into non-textually based arguments about interpretive
principles. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (noting that
"[b]ecause there is no constitutional text speaking to [the question of the
constitutionality of compelling state officials to execute federal laws], the answer ...
must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the
Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court."). Indeed, Scalia contends that it
is through "consideration of the structure of the Constitution" that he "discern[s]
among its 'essential postulates,"' a principle of "dual sovereignty" that controls the
case. Id. at 918 (citation and alteration omitted).
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they are being justified. My engagement with the question of how the
Constitution may limit government efforts to secure equal citizenship
thus begins by examining whether and in what ways the dominant
majority on the Supreme Court has created and established such
limits, and the underlying justifications of those limits.
While I do not hold the view that there is something inherent in the

Constitution that inevitably and fatally constricts the possibilities of
government action to secure equal citizenship, it is certainly the case
that current interpretive approaches now prevalent in the Supreme
Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence lead precisely to such
limitations. Among the limitations external to the Equal Protection
guarantee, the culprits are many: federalism, states' rights, state
sovereignty and the requirement of state action.6 But purportedly
embedded within the Clause itself is another powerful constraint: a
mediating principle that defines equal protection as equal treatment.
Recent Supreme Court decisions reflect the view that not only is the
Equal Protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent
with the principle of equal treatment, but that equal treatment defines
the scope of equal protection in its entirety. This stands in contrast to
longstanding axioms of equal protection that command not only that
the similarly situated should be treated alike, but that those who are
differently situated should be treated differently.7 The second prong
6. I freely acknowledge that principles of autonomy, individual liberty, as well as
conceptions of property have been read to restrict governmental action designed to
eliminate inequality. Examples include R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,505 U.S. 377 (1992)
(invalidating a municipal bias-motivated crime ordinance as violative of First
Amendment protections of free expression), and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that First
Amendment expressive rights of parade organizers included the right to exclude
openly gay and lesbian Irish-American group from marching under banner identifying
the group in Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade). Since the early days of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the provision has been read to incorporate a state action
requirement used to invalidate congressional legislation adopted to address racial
inequality. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). More recently, in a 5-4 decision,
the Court invalidated provisions of the Violence Against Women Act on similar
grounds. The Court held that the reach of Section 5 enforcement powers did not
encompass the creation of a federal civil cause of action for victims of gendermotivated violence, as the injuries were caused by private actors. United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Moreover, the Court's insistence on proof of specific
intent to discriminate in cases where facially neutral laws have produced racially
disparate impact severely limits the reach of the Constitution in addressing racial and
other forms of inequality. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). While
all of these limitations have been prevalent and persistent, my point is simply that
nothing in the text of the Constitution itself compels such results.
7. As expressed by Laurence Tribe:
[A] distinction should be made between two basic ways in which the
constitutional norm [of equal protection] can be violated. First, equality can
be denied when government classifies so as to distinguish, in its rules or
programs, between persons who should be regarded as similarly
situated .... Second, equality can be denied when government fails to
classify, with the result that its rules or programs do not distinguish between
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of this analysis has been excised from the majority view with respect
to race. Actual differences between the races are beyond the reach of
the law unless there is evidence they were intentionally and
maliciously produced, or the argument runs they are not real or
relevant differences. Thus, Equal Protection means only equal
treatment. When equal treatment defines equal protection, not only
are subordinated groups foreclosed from exercising effective legal
remedies, but the law functions to actually promote and entrench
subordination. This article contends that the current constitutional
concept of equal treatment as equal protection exploits and
reproduces inequality.
Equal treatment as equal protection rests on a particular
(mis)conception of groups in general and of race in particular. This
version of the equality principle depends on the disaggregation of
history and social context and the mischaracterization of group
identity. Because one precondition to the attainment of equality is
the elimination of institutional dominance, and in turn this is primarily
a group experience, groups are central to equal citizenship.
Discrimination is not only an act of an individual actor against an
individual victim, but a set of engrained institutional preferences that
operate to continue to exclude the previously excluded. This
exclusion operates against individuals, but against individuals as
members of a group.' Yet, to the adherents of equal treatment, group
identities are incoherent and normatively suspect. The perceived
incoherency is based on the notion that group identities are shifting
and unstable. The claim that group identity is normatively suspect
derives from the notion that assertions of group identity actually reify
or manufacture identity differences, differences that encourage
discrimination and undermine national unity. Theoretically, neither
the incoherency argument nor the normative concern about group
identity claims is illegitimate or specious. Indeed, groups are fluid and
relational. And, there are ample examples of how group identity can
persons who, for equal protection purposes, should be regarded as
differently situated. So it was with the majestic equality of French law,
which Anatole France described as forbidding rich and poor alike to sleep
under the bridges of Paris.... As the Supreme Court observed in Jenness v.

Fortson, "sometimes the greatest discrimination can lie in treating things
that are different as though they were exactly alike."
Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 1438-39 (2d ed., 1988) (citation
omitted).
8. See Burke Marshall, A Comment on the Non-Discrimination Principle in a
"Nation of Minorities", 93 Yale LJ. 1006, 1006 (arguing that discrimination and
subordination were imposed not against individuals but against a people so that the
remedy "has to correct and compensate for the discrimination against the people and
not just discrimination against identifiable persons.") This does not mean that all
members of the group experience the exclusion the same way. Nevertheless, racial
subordination is by definition focused upon the domination of groups. Thus, it is
impossible to understand equality and inequality without also having sustained
engagement with groups.
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be asserted in highly destructive terms. But within the context of the
Court's current Equal Protection analysis, the deployment of these
arguments is deeply problematic. More specifically, each argument is
enlisted as part of a jurisprudential strategy to recognize or see race
(i.e. the racial identities of particular bodies) in order to de-recognize
or not see race (i.e. a structural system of group-based privileges and
disadvantages produced by socio-historical forces).
The equal
treatment as equal protection principle is buttressed by this
recognition/de-recognition dynamic. Thus, even as the recognition of
certain groups and group-based claims are rejected as illegitimate and
counter to principles of neutrality, other group hierarchies are
naturalized and at times even declared non-existent. The result is that
race and racial inequality are made to disappear.
In order to tell the story of how equal treatment came to stand
(again) for equal protection and what this has done (and failed to do)
with respect to inequality, I begin by examining the Court's historical
engagement with race. Part I of the project advances two basic points:
First, the Court is not simply reflecting commonly held
understandings of race; it is engaged in constructing them. Second,
these conceptions are contingent and unstable. Each of these points is
crucial to unpacking the Court's doctrinal treatment of equal
treatment as equal protection and is the framework for understanding
what I am calling the jurisprudential strategy of recognition and derecognition of race.
Part II shifts discussion away from a general account of the role the
Supreme Court historically has played in constructing race to a
specific discussion of colorblindness as the ideological center of the
Court's view of equal protection. Here I provide a brief account of
the ascent of the colorblind constitutionalism in order to illustrate
how the Court's equal protection doctrine is tied to its conceptions of
race. The move to colorblindness-to de-recognize or "not see"
race-has rested upon a very specific reconceptualization of race-a
recognition or way of "seeing" race. Paradoxically then, in order not
to see race, one must see race in a particular way. In this sense, not
only does colorblindness not render race irrelevant; it ensures its
visibility.
Part III entails a close examination of two important cases in which
the Court recognizes and de-recognizes race: Rice v. Cayetano9 and
9. 528 U.S. 495 (2000). The Court's decision in Rice is based not on the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but the Fifteenth Amendment
guarantee that "the right to vote shall not be abridged on account of race, color or
previous condition of servitude." Despite the different sources for the analysis, the
Court's vision of what equal protection requires under the Fourteenth Amendment
and what equality commands under the Fifteenth are quite closely related. See
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (redrawing of city's boundaries to exclude
blacks from participating in city elections challenged under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments).
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Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.10 In both cases, the opinions
advanced the argument that equality compels equal treatment for all,
notwithstanding underlying differences, as distinctions that implicate
race are either illegitimate, unsustainable or incoherent. In both
cases, the end result is that inequality is reproduced.
There are certainly other cases that could be included as exemplars
of the recognition/de-recognition dynamic I describe," but I want to
focus on these two in order to illuminate another point: equality can
be reduced to equal treatment only when groups are disaggregated
from history and social context, and are reshaped through the concept
of race. In these two cases, the rights of historically subordinated
groups are adjudicated under the rubric of race. In both cases, the
Court engages in similar strategies of racial recognition and derecognition; it recognizes or "sees" race in order to de-recognize or
"not see" race. Indeed, in each case the court redefines race in order
to banish it. In Bakke, racial groups are transformed into ethnicities.
In Rice, an aboriginal people is transformed into a race. In each case
the feat is accomplished by a re-telling of history, a history not only
about the particular issues in the case, but about the history and
meaning of race. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke teaches that the
white majority and white racial privilege are in fact not artifacts of
race but of ethnicity-what looks like race is not race. The Rice
majority asserts that what looks like a form of recompense to an
aboriginal people is in fact a racial preference. What looks like
something other than race, is in fact race. While on the one hand
Bakke reconfigures race as ethnicity and Rice reconfigures an
aboriginal people as a racial group, each case reveals both the Court's
full engagement in constructing an account of race, as well as the
centrality of the Court's racial conceptions to the notion that equality
means only equal treatment.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RACE

In contemporary social, legal and political discourse, race is a
chameleon. Race is cast as skin color, as biology, as diversity, as
ethnicity, as a form of class, as psychology, as fictive, as an empty set,
10. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
11. The application of equal treatment as equal protection to cases explicitly
involving race and the rights of subordinated groups is my focus here, but it is worth
noting that the principle of equal treatment as equal protection "has legs" and has
found its way into cases in which race has never been mentioned with, I would argue,

equally pernicious results. See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (reversing a
decision of the Florida Supreme Court requiring a manual recount in certain

contested counties of ballots cast in a presidential election because the process had
insufficient guarantees of "equal treatment" of all ballots-equal treatment being
what equal protection requires). The profound irony of the case is that while the
racial dimensions of the vote counting problems loomed large in the public debate,
race did not figure anywhere in the Court's discussion of the issues.
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as a political strategy. We all believe we know race when we see it,
yet we are hard-pressed to agree as to when we have seen it, or when2
it is meaningful, in part because we do not agree about what race is.1
What do we mean when we talk about race?
In truth, no definition of race-not even a comprehensive, nuanced
one-will in and of itself provide the key to dismantling racial
inequality, eliminating racial subordination, or solving any of the
other complex structural issues that involve race. The centrality of
race in contemporary social, political and economic reality ensures
that "race" will be invoked and that invocation will call forth3
contentious and multiple meanings, both implicit and explicit.1
Assuming even that one believes that such problems have largely
been solved, there is not even a definition of race that will "get us
beyond race."' 4 Given that fact, I want to examine more closely the
12. As Leslie Espinoza says:
This is the problem of race. It is both easily knowable and an illusion. It is
obviously about color and yet not about color. It is about ancestry and
bloodlines and not about ancestry and bloodlines. It is about cultural
histories and not about cultural histories. It is about language and not about
language. We strive to have a knowable, systemic explanation for race. We
struggle with its elusivity.... Race should be rational and it is not.
Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1585,1609-10 (1997).
13. As john powell argues, "At any given moment race has a number of different
meanings and these meanings often interact with each other in complex ways." john
a. powell, The "Racing" of American Society: Race Functioning as a Verb Before
Signifying as a Noun, 15 Law & Ineq. 99, 114 (1997).
14. For an example of a definition of race that endeavors to reveal the emptiness
of the construct, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father's House: Africa in the
Philosophy of Culture 28-46 (1992). Appiah contends that because there is no
coherence to the idea of race, there really is nothing to be gained by using or invoking
"race". Instead, he argues that the differences we talk about when we invoke race are
really cultural. Id. at 45. Yet, even assuming that race is really a "metonym for
culture," id. there is no evidence that recognizing cultural differences as cultural
instead of racial prevents the phenomenon of racialization or racial formation. See
Michael Omi & Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the
1960s to the 1990s, 55 (2d. ed. 1994) (describing "racial formation" as "the
sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed,
and destroyed" (emphasis omitted)). Thus, for example, even if we acknowledge that
it makes little sense to think of Jews as a "race" since most differences denoted by
that identity are really cultural and religious in nature, this recognition of the identity
as cultural does not prevent Jews from being racialized in certain periods. In those
moments, Jews as a "race" come to signify a complex stereotype: they are constructed
as racially distinct, typified as both intellectually superior and morally deficient. See
Sander L. Gilman, Smart Jews: The Construction of the Image of Jewish Superior
Intelligence (1996). For a critique of Appiah's argument, see Jayne Chong-Soon Lee,
Navigating the Topology of Race, in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That
Formed the Movement 441-49 (Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that
Appiah's question is incorrectly focused on the content of the category of race rather
than the social processes which brought about "race"). I believe that Orlando
Patterson makes a similar error by arguing that references to ethnicity should replace
the use of "race". See Orlando Patterson, The Race Trap, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1997, at
A27.
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role of the law in the construction of race, through focusing on the
Supreme Court as a specific and important site of racial
conceptualization-a place where race is given meaning.
The Court's interpretation of equal protection commands that we
not see race or at least that we not see the materiality of race. In so
doing, the Court reconfigures race as neutral and fixed. Indeed, it
directs that we see race as a proxy for some other "real" phenomenon.
The Court thus constructs race, infusing race with a particular
meaning in order to assert its irrelevance.
A. The Constitutive Force of Law
Because the law is by its nature a conservative, backward looking
enterprise, governed by interpretive rules which tie it to the past, it is
sometimes assumed that its role in the construction of dominant
beliefs, consciousness and ideologies is primarily reiterative rather
than innovative. On this view, the law's articulation of a "new" social
reality represents a legitimation or consolidation of a shift that has
already occurred elsewhere outside of law's domain.15 While it is
certainly the case that the Supreme Court is an institution that is
deeply influenced by external events, the relationship between law
and social reality is more complex than the external/internal
dichotomy would allow. Neither the standard liberal account which
describes law as an institution that exists apart from or outside of
politics, nor the cruder forms of the left critique which see the law as
"merely an 'ideological reflection of some class interests elsewhere"'16
15. For example, the Supreme Court's 1937 decision in lVest Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which repudiated Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), is sometimes described as such an instance. In Lochner the Supreme Court
invalidated a labor law restricting the maximum hours of work for bakers because of
its alleged interference with a fundamental "freedom of contract." Lochner, 198 U.S.
at 64. This right, as Holmes' dissent somewhat caustically pointed out, was not to be
found in the Constitution's guarantee of due process, but rather was derived from the
majority's assumptions about the economic system and the free market. Id. at 75-76
(Holmes, J., dissenting). By the time of the Court's decision in West Coast Hotel, the
failure of the economy and the emergence of the Great Depression had called into
question the laissez-faire market ideology that was the underpinning of Lochner.
Thus, in some accounts the Court's move away from substantive economic due
-process epitomized by Lochner is an instance of external political events driving the
doctrinal shift
One influential text in constitutional law described the change as follows:
By the mid-1930s the Court was prepared to abandon Lochner.This was due
to changes in the composition of the Court, internal tensions in the doctrine,
an attack on market ordering as a product of law and as sometimes
inefficient and unjust, increasing judicial and academic criticism, and,
perhaps most important, the economic realities of the Depression, which
seemed to undermine Lochner'scentral premises.
Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law, 831 (3d ed. 1996).
16. Kimberld W. Crenshaw et al., Introduction to Critical Race Theory: The Key
Writings That Formed the Movement, at xxiv (1995) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Critical
Race Theory].

1762

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

adequately account for the crucial role of the law in the production of
"consensus" and the definition of interests which are at the heart of
political discourse and social concern. Clearly, the law is different
from other terrains of political contest, and is structurally both more
conservative in its express commitments (e.g., stare decisis, issues of
institutional competence) and opaque in its forms; but it is also a site
in which dynamic social debate takes place and in which views and
ideology are worked, reworked and given power. It is a place where
new "consensus" emerges and is pushed forward. It is an institution
that does not simply reflect the prevailing social order but is one
which has "constitutive force... [and is] thoroughly involved in
constructing the rules of the game, in selecting the eligible players and
in choosing the field on which the game is played."17
This is especially true with regard to race. In the United States, the
law has always been deeply implicated in assigning, negotiating and
defining race. Indeed, as many have argued, it has been one of the
law's central tasks. The exercise of racial power through law was a
foundational element of slavery and a crucial aspect of the regime of
racial subordination that emerged from it. In the post-slavery era the
law continued to construct and reformulate race in two interrelated
ways. First, it overtly elaborated race as an analytic category and
collective group experience subject to and the object of legal analysis
and doctrine. 8 Secondly, it indirectly structured racial identities
through the "rule of law" of the liberal polity where the values of
neutrality and objectivity were enshrined more broadly and racial
inequality was rationalized and legitimated. 9 Indeed, one of the
central projects of the body of work known as critical race theory has

17. Id. at xxv.
18. Black racial identity was the mark of slavery and the marker of subordination.
See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,106 Harv. L. Rev. 1709,1716-21 (1993).
19. Crenshaw, Critical Race Theory, supra note 16, at xxv. As Crenshaw notes
elsewhere, this has been one of the principal functions of constructs of "merit" and
the "market." See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331,
1380 (1988). One such example from anti-discrimination law is Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976). There the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge
to the use of "neutral testing" by the Police Department on the grounds that racial
disparities in the pass/fail rate were not sufficient evidence of racial discrimination.
The Court was unwilling to adopt either heightened scrutiny or even the evidentiary
presumption of Title VII claims: evidence of disparate impact gives rise to a prima
facie case of discrimination rebuttable by evidence of business necessity. In part the
Court said that to require the state to justify neutral practices that produce unequal
results would be problematic because it would open up a whole range of statutes and
rules to such scrutiny and perhaps invalidate them. See id. at 248. The racial
inequality produced by the test was thus deemed inconclusive and insufficient
evidence of an equal protection violation. In effect, both the test and the racially
disparate results it produced were affirmed as legitimate.
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been "[to] uncover how law was a constitutive element of race
itself... [to uncover] how the law constructed race.'" B. The Shifting Meaning of Race When Race is Legally Fixed
Neil Gotanda's foundational work, A Critique of "Our Constitution
is Colorblind,"21 points out that while race has been a persistent
category by which people have been classified and socially
determined, the dominant consensus about race expressed through
law has changed over time. Thus, he notes legal conceptualizations of
race have embraced at least four identifiable strands: 1) status-race, in
which race is seen as largely inherited and assigned social status;" 2)
formal race, in which race is "seen as [a] neutral, apolitical
descriptionfl, reflecting merely 'skin color' or region of ancestral
origin"' disconnected from any other social attribute'. 4 3) historicalrace, in which race embodies past and continuing racial
subordination; and 4) culture-race which Gotanda reads as a specific
reference to "black as African-American culture, community and
consciousness."'
Despite these significant shifts in racial conceptions, Gotanda
argues that one of the critical and salient characteristics of the law's
description of race has been to treat race as though it is fixed and
determinate when in fact it is both historically contingent and socially
and legally constructed. The mutability of racial categorization is
obscured and race is given the status of immutability, becoming not
merely objective fact but super-objective fact. Under an asserted
regime of empirical certainty, the Court has pursued various racial
projects that are highly political in character. - By maintaining that
20. Crenshaw, Critical Race Theory, supra note 16, at xxv.
21. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Colorblind", in Crenshaw,

Critical Race Theory, supra note 16, at 257-75.
22. His example of the paradigm case here would be Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60

U.S. 393 (1857), where according to the majority view, there is a natural hierarchy of
the races. Gotanda, supra note 21, at 262.
23. Gotanda, supra note 21, at 257.
24. Here, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) is the case that comes to mind.
Gotanda, supra note 21, at 263.

25. In Loving v. Virginia, the Court rejected Virginia's assertion that its antimiscegenation law did not offend equal protection because Blacks and whites were
equally constrained. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court found that

despite the formally equal treatment accorded those who transgressed the law, in fact
the purpose of the law was to maintain the purity of the white race and uphold the
system of white supremacy. Ild. at 11-12. Loving can be read as a case which
acknowledges the linkage between racial categories and subordination in contrast to
Plessy-a case embracing formal race-in which the existence of that linkage is
denied.
26. Gotanda, supra note 21, at 258. While Gotanda specifically refers to culture-

race as African-American it is not a concept limited to Blacks. Rather as he contends,
"[clulture-race is the basis for the developing concept of cultural diversity."fd.
27. As Omi and Winant argue, the conception of race has historically been
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race is a fixed characteristic that functions the same way in all
contexts, the Court has endeavored to preserve and support its claim
of neutrality in adjudicating issues that implicate race. Its engagement
with race is not one that is self-constructed or self-directed; rather the
Court's understanding of race is one that is determined by external
forces which in turn define the reality of race that is received and
reported as part of law. The Court conceptualizes race as a
phenomenon that is "out there."
Common sense has replaced
"science" as a source of understanding race, but in both instances,
then and now, the Court articulates the view that race is external to
the operation of law and is thus an objective fact which the Court
simply observes.
The important consequence of the law's
construction and legitimation of race is that political choices are
naturalized and given the dimension of order and routine, indeed, law
itself.

II. THE PRESENT ERA: THE ASCENT OF THE
COLORBLIND CONSTITUTION

While some have argued that the Supreme Court's views are
inconsistent or out of touch with public politics or even with what
happens in the law more broadly, the ascendancy of colorblindness in
the Court's decisions is not only consistent with general political
trends, but a view the Court itself enables and empowers. Consider
for example the selective appropriations of anti-racist discourse from
important historical figures that are used to support the attack on
affirmative action. Fractional redactions of Martin Luther King's
speech-"it is not the color of one's skin but the content of one's
character"-are paired with clips from Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson-"[o]urConstitution is color-blind"' - to form an important
and ubiquitous part of anti-affirmative action discourse. Indeed, they
are explicitly cited as validation of Proposition 209 and its progeny.29
The legal conception of colorblindness now constitutes the political

contested and given the role of the state in enforcing racial regimes, the state is a
crucial site of this contest. See Omi & Winant, supra note 14, at 65.
28. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
29. See Greg Lucas & Edward W. Lempinen, State GOP Pulls King Ad But Not
Blitz: Party Still Will Spend Millions to Push Prop.209, S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 25, 1996,
at A21 (describing a plan to use Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream Speech" as a
way of reducing the meaning of race to skin color, thus making racial preferences
fundamentally arbitrary). See also Ronald Walters, Affirmative Action and the
Politics of Concept Appropriation, 38 How. L.J. 587, 600 (1995) (describing the
capture and appropriation of discourse and norms of the civil rights movement by
opponents of civil rights, so that "where racial discrimination was originally defined as
the prohibition or exclusion of blacks and other disadvantaged groups from access to
normal or equal participation in society, it has devolved to mean any racial
distinction.").
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vision, and the language and reasoning of the law has itself become
part of the political rhetoric.'
Since 1989, the Court has struck down every affirmative action
program that it has reviewed, save one-Metro Broadcasting,31 a 5-4
decision, which was subsequently overruled by Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena." The move from tentative approval and intermediate
review in split opinions to a solid majority in favor of strict scrutiny of
affirmative action programs has been one of the most striking features
of this period. Thus, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.3 and
finally in Adarand, a majority of the Supreme Court has held that all
race conscious remediation programs must be reviewed under a
standard of strict scrutiny, notwithstanding their benign intent, or
whether they are the product of action taken by the federal
government pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
powers.
This shift marks a period in which the majority's vision of equality is
premised upon a specific understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. That understanding is a
command that the state not take race into account in formulating
public policy-the state must be colorblind.
Why does the
Constitution command that the state not see race? The constitutional
answer cannot lie merely in a policy preference regarding which is the
better or most efficacious way to eliminate racial subordination. To
take race into account or to refuse to take race into account then
becomes a matter of policy for the legislature to decide. The
Constitution can trump this policy choice only if equal protection
requires that it do so. Thus, the assertion of colorblindness as equal
protection mandate rests upon the contention that the races are
formally and legally equal; neither substantive inequality, nor past or
present forms of racial oppression change how the law should treat
racial groups or individual members of such groups. Indeed,
adherents of this view argue that the Constitution commands that the
law not see these groups; the law must see only (raceless) individuals.
Because all racial identities are the same, all racial distinctions are
prohibited whether for good or bad reasons. Since there is no
fundamental difference between racial groups, equal treatment
constitutes the sum total of equal protection. The law must be blind
to race. And yet, in order for the Court to enforce the eradication of
30. There is a strong interactive relationship between the political and legal
rhetoric and visions. See John 0. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's "Messy" Real
World of Race: An Essayfor "Naked People Longing to Swim Free", 15 Law & Ineq.
25,53 (1997) (describing how neo-conservative and right-wing racial projects have led
and influenced the Court, which in turn "is intentionally solidifying the projects'

gains").

31. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
32. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
33. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).

1766

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

race it must tell us what race is-it must "see" race-re-inscribing it
once again within legal doctrine.
The Court sees race as an aspect of identity that is apolitical, nonmaterial and neutral. Race, as the Court views it, is essentially raceless. Put another way, while the Court's colorblind jurisprudence is
ostensibly race-neutral, these ideas rest upon, and the Court is
invested in, a particular account of race. Paradoxically, under the
regime of colorblindness, the debate about what race is takes center
stage and the salience of race is intensified.
As this account reveals, the Court's vision of equality under the
Constitution is linked to its formalist vision of race. Indeed, this
vision helps to explain the doctrinal shift in Equal Protection.
Concretely, the Court's construction of colorblind race accompanies
and animates the colorblind view of the Constitution. This is a "way
of seeing" race and racial (in)equality that is new and yet not new; it is
rather a variation on a theme. While modem decisions of the Court
have repudiated Judge Taney's vision in Dred Scott of a natural, racial
hierarchy, Taney's reading of racial "type" from the "objective" fact
of blood, skin and physical features is very much alive in the current
equal protection jurisprudence. Today, the notion of a racial type or
the idea of race as blood is not articulated especially to support racial
hierarchy. Instead, the conception of race as blood is redeployed in
furtherance of the argument that race is "a neutral and apolitical term
without social content."' Through the claim that race is only blood or
skin color, and in its essence biologic, the Court's new majority treats
race like height or other physical attributes - a fact without moral or
social meaning and hence, without legal significance. This is the
linchpin of the argument that the Constitution compels colorblindness
and that all race consciousness or even racial recognition is another
form of racism and racial subordination. Colorblindness is said to be
the true meaning of equality and lays claim to historical pedigree and
original, "pure" meaning.
The Supreme Court's insistence on the extension of strict scrutiny
to all uses of race, even when deployed to remediate long-standing
patterns of racial inequality, represents the repackaging of the
formalist precepts about race implicit in the reasoning and holding of
the Court's majority in Plessy
In Plessy the Court asserted that
there was no equal protection violation in excluding Blacks from train
cars reserved for whites, because whites were equally excluded from
train cars reserved for Blacks and subject to criminal penalties.
Underpinning the Court's analysis was the assumption-indeed, the
assertion-that the exclusion meant the same thing for both Blacks
and whites. Plessy's contention that the exclusion was meant to and in
34. Gotanda, supra note 21, at 261.
35. Id. at 263.
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fact did enforce racial subordination was dismissed by the majority as
a matter
of viewpoint, of a chosen construction placed on the act by
36
Blacks.
As was the case with the Supreme Court of 1896, because to today's
Supreme Court race is merely color, race is without social significance.
Because being Black in America holds the same meaning as being
white, both should be treated the same in the context of claims of
racial subordination. The modem Court thus lifts the words of
Harlan's dissent: "Our Constitution is color-blind" as an affirmation
of that formalism. Yet, it simultaneously disregards the heart of
Harlan's argument that state sponsored segregation violated the
Equal Protection Clause because, at least as it pertains to the public
sphere-an important limitation under Harlan's analysis-the law
should not ignore that race-based exclusion was intentionally and
inherently subordinating. 7 The formal assertion that all are citizens
and that all are then treated equally by a rule of equal prohibitions
ignores the fundamental inequality between racial groups. Because
racial categories and identities are tightly bound to a regime of
hierarchy and subordination, "white" and "Black" are not then
symmetrical in their societal or experiential meaning.
This
fundamental insight offered by Harlan is ignored at the same time that
the Court enshrines his words. Equal treatment then cannot be the
sum total of equal protection because the application of that principle
requires that the circumstances of the groups be similar. Race,
however, embodies asymmetry-of resources, power, access, and
social status.
III. EQUALITY AS EQUAL TREATMENT IN BAKKE AND RICE

Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and the majority opinion in Rice
are cases that strongly articulate the equal treatment as equality
principle.
Each case argues for equal treatment through a
particularized conception of race in which race is conflated with
something else. Redescribing race as another feature of social
identity, or alternately identifying another feature of social identity as
race, is key to the decision to extend equal treatment-strict
scrutiny-to affirmative action in one case and a set of state enacted
reparative measures in another. The state's remedial powers were
then circumscribed by the very doctrine of equal protection and
conception of equality adopted by the Court. In this part, I more
closely examine the rationales offered in each case as part of
interrogating the Court's racial project.
36. As proof the Court asked whether whites would feel oppressed if Blacks
enacted rules of racial exclusion against whites. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551

(1896).
37. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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A. Equal Treatment as Equality: Bakke as the FoundationalStatement
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is a foundational statement of the
equal treatment as equal protection principle. Bakke's equal
protection claim derived from the decision by the Medical School at
the University of California at Davis denying Bakke admission.
Bakke alleged that the Medical School's decision violated equal
protection guarantees because his MCAT scores and GPA were
higher than the primarily Black, Latino and Asian students admitted
through a special program for disadvantaged students. Because his
academic qualifications as measured by grades and test scores were
higher than the special admissions group, Bakke reasoned that he had
been unlawfully denied admission on account of his race and thus the
principle of equal protection had been violated. 8
In the end, a plurality of the Court agreed that Bakke should be
admitted, but the case did not produce a unified rationale. Indeed,
the sharply split opinions of the Court make it difficult to say what the
Court held.39 What is notable is that Justice Powell's opinion was the
only one that ruled for Bakke on the basis of his equal protection
challenge, arguing explicitly that strict scrutiny review should apply.40
Contemporary understandings of equality owe a great deal to
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke-an opinion remarkable for its
enduring presence, prescience and at least for some decades, its
influence. It is also remarkable for its schizophrenic treatment of
group identity-for both seeing and not seeing race. While Powell
recognized and affirmed the significance and importance of
considering race in admitting a diverse class,41 the remainder of his
opinion functioned to repudiate the legitimacy and efficacy of
substantive interventions by the state to remedy the unequal
distribution of power under the current racial status quo because of
the incoherence of racial identity. Thus, the only way out of the
morass, according to Powell, is to accord equal treatment across the
board, and apply strict scrutiny to all forms of state policy that
implicate race, notwithstanding the underlying intent or difference in
circumstances.

38. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,276-79 (1978).
39. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Stevens, Burger and Stewart reasoned that
the special admissions plan constituted a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
and did not reach the constitutional question directly. Id. at 408-21 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Marshall, Brennan, White and
Blackmun held that the evaluation of the affirmative action plan should proceed
under a kind of intermediate Equal Protection review and that under that standard
the school had established the necessary justification of the program. Id. at 355-79.
40. Id. at 290-305.
41. Id. at 315-20.
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In defense of Davis' program, the university argued that even if
affirmative action was deemed to disadvantage whites, it was a policy
adopted by the majority against itself and thus was not equivalent to a
policy adopted by a majority against a discrete and insular minority
without political power." Powell vigorously rejected this argument in
the following passage:
[P]etitioner argues that the court below erred in applying strict
scrutiny to the special admissions program because white males,
such as respondent, are not a "discrete and insular minority"
requiring extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process. This rationale, however, has never been invoked in our
decisions as a prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions
to strict scrutiny.... Racial and ethnic classifications, however, are
subject to stringent examination without regard to these additional
characteristics.... This perception of racial and ethnic distinctions
is rooted in our Nation's constitutional and demographic history.
The Court's initial view of the Fourteenth Amendment was that its
"one pervading purpose" was "the freedom of the slave race ... "
[But] it was only as the era of substantive due process came to a
close that the Equal Protection Clause began to attain a genuine
measure of vitality.
By that time it was no longer possible to peg the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the struggle for equality of one racial
minority. During the dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause the
United States had become a Nation of minorities. Each had to
struggle-and to some extent struggles still-to overcome the
prejudices not of a monolithic "majority," but of a "majority"
composed of various minority groups of whom it was said-perhaps
unfairly in many cases-that a shared characteristic was a
willingness to disadvantage other groups. As the Nation filled with
the stock of many lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually
extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from official
discrimination....
Petitioner urges us to adopt for the first time a more restrictive
view of the Equal Protection Clause and hold that discrimination
against members of the white "majority" cannot be suspect if its
purpose can be characterized as "benign." ... It is far too late to
argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits
the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection
greater than that accorded others.... Once the artificial line of a
"two-class theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment is put aside, the
difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial review according
to a perceived "preferred" status of a particular racial or ethnic
minority are intractable. The concepts of "majority" and "minority"
42. This is John Hart Ely's argument regarding why affirmative action is not per
se subject to strict scrutiny. John Hart Ely, The Constituionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination,41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1974).
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necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments.
As observed above, the white "majority" itself is composed of
various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of
prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private
individuals. Not all of these groups can receive preferential
treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn
in terms of race and nationality, for then the only "majority" left
would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. There
is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit
"heightened judicial solicitude" and which would not. Courts would
be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent
harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose societal
injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then
would be entitled to preferential classifications at the expense of
individuals belonging to other groups. Those classifications would
be free from exacting judicial scrutiny. As these preferences began
to have their desired effect, and the consequences of past
discrimination were undone, new judicial rankings would be
necessary. The kind of variable sociological and political analysis
necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the
judicial competence-even
if they otherwise were politically feasible
43
and socially desirable.
In reaching the conclusion that equal protection can only be
guaranteed by equal treatment, Powell was compelled to first engage
the issue of race. In doing so, he took a noted departure from
biologically-based notions of race and redefined race through a kind
of social constructionist analysis. While social practices continue to
follow the notion that race is a genealogy of the "blood," social
constructionists argue that race is constructed despite its biologic and
pseudo-scientific trappings. Thus, racial identity formally follows
rules of descent but within those rules44 as Gotanda has revealed,
blood functions not as a scientific fact but as a metaphor-a metaphor
asymmetrically constructed to buttress white supremacy.45
This
underscores the fact that as Omi and Winant have demonstrated in
their work on racial formation, groups are racialized as a result of
historical forces and processes; racial identities are the ideological and
material product of these forces.46 Undertaking the archeology of
43. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-97 (citations and footnotes omitted).
44. The blood quantum rules that included the one drop rule and its variations
were not only social norms at one point but actual legal rules. See Harris, supra note
18, at 1738.
45. Gotanda, supra note 21, at 259. As Plessy's lawyer asked, why is the rule not
the reverse? In his brief he argued,
It may be said that all those should be classed as colored in whom appears a
visible admixture of colored blood. By what law? With what justice? Why
not count everyone as white in whom is visible any trace of white blood?
There is but one reason to wit, the domination of the white race.
Brief of Homer Plessy, cited in Harris, supra note 18, at 1748.
46. Omi & Winant, supra note 14, at 54-58.
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race requires attention not to the physical sciences but to the social
sciences. Critical interventions from many disciplines including law
have traced how a bounded and determinate category like "white
person" was actually negotiated; it was an exclusive club into which
various groups were gradually admitted.47
Powell's argument is a classic invocation of social constructionism:
"white" is not a monolithic category fixed by biology; it is a
"'majority' composed of various minorit[ies]."
Powell anticipates
the claim that the salient and unifying characteristic of this
amalgamation was that it defined itself in relation to what it was notthat at its core white identity was centered on a right to exclude
others. He counters this argument by pointing to the history of
nativist and anti-immigrant sentiment which meant that, "each
[minority] had to struggle-and to some extent struggles still-to
overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a
'majority' composed of various minority groups ....

."'I

This history of

anti-immigrant bias suffered by many then rebuts the claim that the
"glue" of white identity was its exclusion and subordination of others.
Thus he argues, "it was said-perhapsunfairly in many cases-that a
shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other
groups."5 This is the sole allusion to the linkage between whiteness
and racial power, between white racial identity and exclusion. All
subsequent references to the white majority "ethnicize" it by
deconstructing it into its constituent parts, each of which has suffered
its own history of oppression.5" The white majority then disintegrates
into a group of ethnic minorities, each of which has equal moral claim
to remediation for historic subordination.' Raising the specter of an
47. See Andrew Hacker, Two Nations 12 (1992) (arguing that the question was
not
so much "who is white" but "who may be considered white" as various ethnic
immigrants
were gradually accepted into a white identity shaped around AngloAmerican norms).

48. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292,295.
49. 1L at 292.
50. I& (emphasis added).

51. As noted by one scholar:

Instead of race, ethnicity is the term used by academic scholars today to
codify the conventional belief in the virtue of assimilation, the gradual
homogenizing of diverse groups predicated on value consensus ("the
American Creed") and the norms of social integration. In this sense
"Americanization" virtually means cultural and psychological suicide for
peoples of color...
E. San Juan, Jr., Racial Formations/Critical Transformations: Articulations of Power
in Ethnic and Racial Studies in the United States 6 (1992). He further notes:
Race not ethnicity articulates with class and gender to generate the effects of
power in all its multiple protean forms. Ethnicity theory eludes power
relations, conjuring an illusory state of parity among bargaining agents. It
serves chiefly to underwrite a functionalist mode of sanctioning a given
social order. It tends to legitimize a pluralist but hierarchical status quo.
Id. at 5.
52. As Alan Freeman notes, the Supreme Court's analysis has fostered "the
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"oppression sweepstakes,"53 Powell concludes that subjecting
affirmative action designed to benefit the historically disadvantaged to
a different standard of review would be unworkable as the idea of a
"white majority" is simply illusory. Race is seen, but seen as ethnicity.
No one ethnic group is different from another in ways that matter
legally; therefore all distinctions drawn on race must be treated the
same.
While the insight that race is socially constructed has been crucial to
the project of mapping the role of law and state power in fixing racial
hierarchy and institutionalizing racial subordination, here social
constructionist accounts of race have been conscripted into the
argument that race and racial consciousness cannot be taken into
account by the state. Because race is mutable and determined by
social forces it is too unstable. It is a sociological fact, not a legal fact,
or a fact that can take the force of law. Alongside the notion of race
as biology, as "mere skin color," or "blood," race is described as a
social construction. Through Powell's partial engagement with the
idea "that the natural is produced by the social," s race is
deconstructed into a category too incoherent to form the basis of any
remedial strategy.
While Powell's opinion is clearly heir to an older tradition of
portraying race as ethnicity, it updates that tradition and puts forward
a more sophisticated spin. It responds to the claim that based on the
experience of group subordination, group remediation was and is
appropriate. Where critical race theorists have linked the insight of
social constructionism to tracking and exposing how law has been
engaged in constructing race, protecting racial hierarchy and
legitimizing racial subordination, Powell's move explicitly decouples
social constructionism from the critique of racial power. Powell's
opinion projects another vision of race in which the "natural"
category of race is seen to be produced by social forces and is highly
mutable-indeed so mutable that the idea of a white majority and by
implication white domination is incoherent. This contention lays the
groundwork for a new consensus about race in which race is not
biologic, but under which whiteness is continually naturalized and
white dominance is legitimated.
Powell's analysis reflects what Kimberl6 Crenshaw has called
"vulgar anti-essentialism." ' 5 This is the claim that since all identities
startling claim of 'ethnic fungibility'-the notion that each of us bears an 'ethnicity'
with an equivalent legal significance and with an identical claim to protection." Alan
Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw: The View From 1989, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1407, 1412
(1990).
53. Regina Austin is the author of this phrase. Regina Austin, Sapphire Boundl,
1989 Wis. L. Rev. 539, 546.
54. Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference 3 (1989)
(emphasis omitted).
55. Thus, "where classical liberalism argued that race was irrelevant to public
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are socially constructed, there is no such thing as "women's"
experience, or "Black" experience or anything that can be legitimately
described as group experience. On this view, any attempt to speak of
"Blacks" or "women" or even "Black women" reproduces illegitimate
categories that mask over difference rather than describe
commonalities. Indeed, they argue that "women" or "Blacks" can be
deconstructed to a set of individual experiences and characteristics
that defy any coherent category. Taken to its logical conclusion this
means that race-based remediation and race consciousness itself is
fatally flawed. While this submergence of race into ethnicity is hardly
new-indeed the origins of the ethnicity lie in an attempt to find
another way of talking about race 56 -this form of race talk facilitates
the erasure of racial privilege and subordination. After all, if race
equals ethnicity it makes no sense to talk about a white ethnicity. This
approach renders incoherent any alternative vision of racial justice
and re-legitimates the existing social order in which myriad forms of
racial inequality are legal and white privilege is simply there.
All this lends itself to a kind of multiple (or split) consciousness
about race expressed and constituted through law: Race is biologic,
immutable; race is also a social construction that is produced. Race is
articulated through culture and is a highly significant and expressive
identity; Race is an artificial veil over ethnicity and is thus irrelevant.
While these conceptions seem to conflict along the vectors of
essentialist vs. constructionist theories of race, they actually cohere in
painting race without tracking or acknowledging the exercise of racial
power.57 The absence of any account of how power and specifically
the force of law was and is brought to bear in forging race and racial
identities allows the court to render a version of race in which race
only coincidentally correlates with life chances and experiences.
Individual experience is primary and group subordination an
historical artifact. Thus on this view disproportionate poverty, wealth,
physical well-being, and life expectancy only happen to correlate with
policy, there critics argued that race simply didn't exist. The position is one we have

come to call "vulgar anti-essentialism." By this we mean to capture the claim made
by some critical theorists that since racial categories are not "real" or "natural" but
are instead socially constructed, it is theoretically and politically absurd to center race

as a category of analysis or as a basis for political action." Crenshaw, Critical Race
Theory, supra note 16, at xxiv.
56. See Omi and Winant, supra note 14, at 14-16 (noting that the ethnicity

paradigm within sociology emerged in the 1920s and 1930s to challenge prevailing
views of race as a natural, biological category). They further note, however, the limits
of ethnicity theory and the immigrant analogy in addressing the dynamics of race,

since the immigration studies that undergirded ethnicity theory had largely focused on
European immigrants whose experiences were not reflective of the lived experience

of race. See id. at 16-20.
57. See Ruth Frankenburg, White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction
of Whiteness 52 (1993) (noting the "color-evasiveness" or "power-evasiveness"
tendency of whites when discussing race to avoid questions of power and hierarchy).
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African-American racial identity as a result of neutral sorting and
choice.58 This is a more sophisticated strategy than the explanation of
racial hierarchy as natural, and is also a way of responding to some of
the obvious defects of the old formalist analysis. In "proving" that
white and Black do not really exist, except as kind of privatized
ethnicities, race is then a concept that must be ignored by the state.
So too is racial disparity unless one can locate the ever elusive intent
and seldom seen discriminatory actor. Thus, in Scalia's words in
Adarand: "In the eyes of the government we are just one race here.
It is American."59
B. Rice v. Cayetano: Equality as Equal Treatment in the New
Millennium

Bakke illustrates how Powell laid the groundwork for the full blown
emergence of colorblind constitutionalism by articulating a particular
conception of race in which race conflates with ethnicity. This
58. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
59. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In contrast to Scalia's Olympic
perspective, the view from the ground is poignantly quite different. LeAlan Jones, a
young African-American man, along with his friend, Lloyd Newman, created two
radio documentaries for National Public Radio about their lives in an impoverished,
racially isolated Chicago neighborhood. They were in their mid-teens at the time the
book based on the documentaries was published:
We live in two different Americas. In the ghetto, our laws are totally
different, our language is totally different, and our lives are totally different.
I've never felt American. I've only felt African-American. An American is
supposed to have life, liberty, prosperity and happiness. But an AfricanAmerican is due pain, poverty, stress and anxiety. As an African-American
I have experienced beautiful things, but the majority of the things I have
experienced are not beautiful. And I don't even have it as bad as mostthere are millions of young men and women living the struggle even harder
than me. As children, they have to make day-to-day decisions about
whether to go to school or whether to go on the comer and sell drugs. As
children, they know that there may not be a tomorrow. Why are AfricanAmerican children faced with this dilemma at such an early age? Why must
they look down the road to a future that they might never see? What have
my people done to this country to deserve this?
And yet I am supposed to feel American. I am supposed to be
patriotic. I am supposed to love this system that has been detrimental to the
lives of my people. It's hard for me to say how I'm an American when I live
in a second America-an America that doesn't wave the red, white and blue
flag with fifty stars for fifty states. I live in a community that waves a white
flag because we have almost given up. I live in a community where on the
walls are the names of fallen comrades of war. I live in a second America. I
live here not because I chose to, but because I have to. I hate to sound
militant, but this is the way I feel.... I know you don't want to hear about
the pain and suffering that goes on in "that" part of the city. But little do
you know that "that" part of the city is your part of the city too. This is our
neighborhood, this is our city and this is our America...."
LeAlan Jones, Lloyd Newman with David Isay, Our America: Life and Death on the
South Side of Chicago 199-200 (1997).
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conceptualization facilitates the doctrinal move to equal treatment as
equal protection as there is no white majority under this model and
thus no basis for distinguishing between the history, social reality or
contemporary meaning of white from Black. Applying a rule of
symmetrical treatment to conditions which are fundamentally unequal
actually reproduces inequality. In focusing on Rice v. Cayetano60 this
part provides another case study of unequal equality.
Harold Rice, a white citizen of the state of Hawaii, challenged
election procedures that excluded non-Hawaiians from voting for
officers of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"), an agency
created to provide redress to Native Hawaiians. Rice contended that
defining the electorate for OHA in terms that restricted the vote to
Native Hawaiians 61 was inherently and irreducibly a racial restriction
that offended the Constitution; it was an instance of treating voters
differently on the basis of race. 62 For a majority of the Court, which in
Adarand had just dictated that Equal Protection analysis must be
guided by notions of consistency and congruence-the basic idea
being to treat everyone alike6-Rice was an easy case. It extended
Adarand's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause to the Fifteenth Amendment guarantees. And, of
course, if one "sees" the way the majority sees, Rice is a paradigm case
of unequal treatment.
But in order to see Rice as the majority perceives it, there is much
that one has to not see. The voting procedures at issue in Rice do not
60. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
61. The relevant statute defined "Hawaiian" and "Native Hawaiian"-the groups
eligible to vote-as follows:
"Hawaiian" means any descendant

of the aboriginal

peoples

inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in
the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued

to reside in Hawaii.
"Native Hawaiian" means any descendant of not less than one-half
part of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778, as defined

by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended; provided that
the term identically refers to the descendants of such blood quantum of such

aboriginal peoples which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the
Hawaiian Islands in 1778 and which peoples thereafter continued to reside in
Hawaii.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10-2 (1993).
62. Rice, 528 U.S. at 517.

63. As the majority opinion in Adarand articulated it, prior case law has
established three general propositions concerning governmental racial classifications:

First, skepticism: "Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must
necessarily receive a most searching examination"... Second, consistency:
"[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not

dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification"... And third, congruence: "Equal Protection analysis in the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment"...
Adarand,515 U.S. at 223-24 (citations omitted).
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mask a narrative about unequal treatment and racial exclusion. It is a
story about equalizing treatment, inclusion and the possibility of
redemption. There is also the matter of history, not only the history
of Hawaii which was central to the case, but also a history or narrative
about race. And the majority is blinded to this story and this history
in part because of how it sees race.
The history of OHA is crucial to an understanding of the case. Yet,
while the majority opinion begins with an account of that history,
what is striking is that it is rendered in terms that make it
unrecognizable and irreconcilable with reality.'
OHA and its
Hawaiian-only election procedures were created by a vote of the
entire electorate of the state as part of the Hawaiian Constitution in
1978.65 OHA was heir to the federally created Hawaiian Homes
Commission that acted as trustee over 200,000 acres of land-socalled "ceded land"-that was to be used for the benefit of Native
Hawaiians. Upon the admission of Hawaii to the union in 1959, the
state took over the Hawaiian Homes Commission and 1.2 million
additional acres of land in trust, with one of the obligations of the
trust being to benefit Native Hawaiians. 66 However, the trust was
poorly administered, and widespread recognition of these problems in
part led to the 1978 constitutional amendments creating OHA that
were approved by an overwhelming majority vote of the state's
electorate. 67
The central fact obscured by the majority's account is that the land
that forms part of the corpus of OHA's trust is land that formerly
belonged to the Hawaiian government. This land was taken by the
United States upon the annexation of Hawaii as a territory in 1900
following the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian government in 1893
by a coup by American businessmen backed by the United States
military.' These are not contested facts. In 1993, the United States
Congress issued a resolution apologizing for United States
government complicity in the illegal overthrow of the Native
Hawaiian government in 1893 and acknowledging that 1.8 million
acres of ceded lands had been obtained "without the consent of or
compensation to the native Hawaiian people of Hawaii or their
64. As the dissent points out: "The Court's holding today rests largely on the
repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to the
compelling history of the State of Hawaii." Rice, 528 U.S. at 527-28 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
65. As Yamamoto notes, "[T]hat OHA and its voting limitation were created by
the overwhelming vote of Hawai'i's multiracial populace partly to rectify the legacies
of U.S. colonialism by affording Hawai'i's indigenous peoples a measure of selfdetermination was completely dismissed by the Court's majority opinion." Sharon K.
Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History,and Social Justice, 47 UCLA
L. Rev. 1747, 1773 (2000).
66. Id. at 1767.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 1766-67.
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'
sovereign government."69
In other words, under the provisions
creating OHA, the indigenous people of Hawaii were granted control
over OHA and the land it controlled because they were the people
from whom the land had been taken. By a democratic vote, the
people of Hawaii-all of them-agreed that the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs should consist of Native Hawaiians selected by Native
Hawaiians.7 The voting mechanism was not an affirmative action
program or some kind of act of reverse discrimination, but was rather
a modest recognition of a right to reparations and self-determination
for an aboriginal people71 who, like most aboriginal people in the
United States, have been the victims of overt state policies designed to
separate them from their land, their culture and their way of life. This
is the basic reality that the majority fails to see.
Rice v. Cayetano marks the extension of the myopic principle of
equal treatment as equal protection in cases concerning race to cases
concerning the rights and interests of indigenous peoples. While
Powell's opinion in Bakke reduced race to ethnicity, in Rice the
Court's majority conflates race with indigenous status, with equally
devastating results. In the name of equal treatment, the claims of
indigenous people for redress are treated as claims for racial
preference, leaving a horrific historical injury beyond recompense.
Rice represents a complete failure to recognize that sameness is not
the equivalent of equality: Treating likes alike-what Equal
Protection commands-is different than treating everyone and
everything alike.
The State and OHA argued that this was not a case in which those
who were similarly situated were treated differently because the status
and position of Native Hawaiians and their relationship to OHA was
essentially different than that of non-Hawaiians. The voting
limitation was not a racial restriction in the first instance because
Native Hawaiians, like Native Americans are political, not racial
minorities.' This argument relied on Morton v. Mancari," in which

69. Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17,
1893 Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, and to Offer an Apology to Native
Hawaiians on Behalf of the United States for the Overthrow of the Kingdom of
Hawaii, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
70. As one example of how the majority conveys facts without context, it reports
that "In 1978 Hawaii amended its Constitution to establish the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs..." Rice, 528 U.S. at 508. However, the majority never once mentions that
these amendments that established the Hawaiian only voting procedures were
approved by a vote of the entire electorate. See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 65, at
1772-73.
71. OHA has been charged with "serving as the principal public agency...
responsible for the performance, development, and coordination of programs and
activities relating to native Hawaiians and Hawaiians ...serving as a receptacle for
reparations." Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10-3 (1993).
72. This was the basis for the Ninth Circuit's rejection of Rice's claim. Rice v.
Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998).
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the Court upheld a hiring preference for Native Americans in the
Bureau of Indian Affairs because the designation "Native American"
was deemed to be a political description of a quasi-sovereign group,
not a racial designation, even though Native Americans were defined
in terms of blood quantum rules typically associated with race.74 Rice
argued, and a majority of the court agreed, however, that Mancari did
not apply in the case because OHA was not a quasi-sovereign entity,
but an agency of the state. While the majority asserted that it did not
have to reach the issue of whether Native Hawaiians have a status
equivalent to the political status of Indians in federally recognized
tribes, the clear import of the decision is that they do not." This is
despite the fact that, as noted by the dissent, numerous acts of
Congress relating to indigenous people include Native Hawaiians as
Native Americans for the purposes of the statutes. 76
In the eyes of the majority the voting procedures for OHA
constituted a racial distinction that clearly offends the equal treatment
principle. On this view, the statute defining Hawaiian and Native
Hawaiian as descendants of aboriginal peoples inhabiting the island
prior to European contact in 1778 amounted to nothing more than a
racial classification. The state argued that "Native Hawaiian" and
"Hawaiian" were not racial categories, but a classification limited to
73. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
74. The preference in Mancarifavored individuals who were "one-fourth or more
degree Indian blood and... member[s] of a Federally-recognized [Indian] tribe."
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974). Like the definition of native
Hawaiians at issue in Rice, the class was defined in terms that referred to lineal
ancestry.
75. The majority reasoned that there was a distinction between elections
excluding non-Indians and elections excluding non-Hawaiians:
If a non-Indian lacks a right to vote in tribal elections, it is for the reason
that such elections are the internal affair of a quasi-sovereign. The OHA
elections, by contrast, are the affair of the State of Hawaii....
[T]he
elections for OHA trustee are elections of the State, not of a separate quasisovereign, and they are elections to which the Fifteenth Amendment applies.
Rice, 528 U.S. at 520-22. However, though the court attempts to draw the distinction
based on whether the entity created is an agency of the state or some more semiautonomous body, in reality the difference the majority seeks to highlight is the
nature of the group-that is whether the group is a political entity-a quasisovereign-as distinct from a racial group. The fact that the state created OHA
rather than Congress is not really a salient distinction since as the dissent points out,
the federal power to pass laws pertaining to its trust relationship with native tribes can
be delegated to the states. Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Were the Court to
consider native Hawaiians to have the status of a quasi-sovereign entity, then the
exclusion of non-Hawaiians from the OHA electorate would not be a racial
restriction but "an internal affair of a quasi-sovereign." Id. at 520. This is why the
dissent concludes: "[I]it is a painful irony indeed to conclude that native Hawaiians
are not entitled to special benefits designed to restore a measure of native selfgovernance because they currently lack any vestigal native government-a possibility
of which history and the actions of this Nation have deprived them." Id. at 535.
76. See id. at 533-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing federal statutes that include
native Hawaiians as part of the aboriginal or indigenous peoples).
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the lineal descendants of the peoples inhabiting Hawaii in 1778,
regardless of their race. Since this group is not solely comprised of
one race, race was neither the singular nor most important criterion
defining the group.'
The statutory definition of Hawaiians and
Native Hawaiians was designed to designate historical, not racial ties.
But the majority rejected the argument:
Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here. Even if the
residents of Hawaii in 1778 had been of more diverse ethnic
backgrounds and cultures, it is far from clear that a voting test
favoring their descendants would not be a race-based qualification.
But that is not this case. For centuries Hawaii was isolated from
migration. The inhabitants shared common physical characteristics,
and by 1778 they had a common culture. Indeed, the drafters of the
statutory definition in question emphasized the "unique culture of
the ancient Hawaiians" in explaining their work.... The provisions

before us reflect the State's effort to preserve that commonality of
people to the present day.
In the interpretation of the
Reconstruction era civil rights laws we have observed that "racial
discrimination" is that which singles out "identifiable classes of
persons

.

.

.

solely because of their ancestry

or ethnic

characteristics." The very object of the statutory definition in
question and of its earlier congressional counterpart in the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act is to treat the early Hawaiians as a distinct
people, commanding their own recognition and respect. The State,
in enacting the legislation before us has used ancestry as a racial
definition and for a racial purpose.78
The Court insists this is a case about race because the voting class is
defined in terms that refer to ancestry and ancestry can function as a
proxy for race. But of course, the fact that it did not function as such
a proxy here-that is there was no evidence that the law was
motivated by a desire to exclude or favor any race -the court treats as
irrelevant. And yet in treating that distinction as irrelevant the
majority's reasoning leads to quite illogical results. Indeed, the
majority's assertion that rules defining a class by ancestry are the
equivalent of rules defining a class by race could extend to invalidate
the treatment of Indians under the numerous federal statutes as an
impermissible racial classification.
What then does the majority cite as evidence that ancestry does
function as a proxy for race here? The Court's majority charges that
the heart of the state's offense is that it derives from the state's efforts,
77. Id. at 514; noting that:

the State argues, the restriction in its operation excludes a person whose
traceable ancestors were exclusively Polynesian if none of those ancestors
resided in Hawaii in 1778; and, on the other hand, the vote would be granted
to a person who could trace, say, one sixty-forth of his or her ancestry to a
Hawaiian inhabitant on the pivotal date.
7M Id. at 514-15 (citation omitted).
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assumed as a condition of its admission to the union, to preserve the
commonality of a culturally distinct people "commanding their own
recognition and respect."7 9
Apparently, according respectful
treatment to a culturally distinct people as a people constitutes a
purpose repugnant to the Constitution; indeed, recognizing Native
Hawaiian people as a culturally distinct indigenous group constitutes a
racial injury. In the eyes of the majority, the act of recognizing an
indigenous people is an act of racial discrimination because the
cultural distinctiveness of this group is seen as a marker of race. Thus,
Rice stands for the proposition that seeing native Hawaiians as Native
Hawaiians is an evil not countenanced by the Constitution.
Though the statute defining "Hawaiian" and "Native Hawaiian"
relies on ancestry, the majority sees ancestry as a synonym for race. 0
In point of fact, however, the statutory definitions have always
focused on the lineal descendants of "peoples" or "races" resident in
the Islands prior to 1778-the date of Captain Cook's arrival."
"Hawaiian" was never conceived as an exclusive racial category. 2
Yet, in the majority view, they are a biologically defined racial group.
The irony is that the majority recognizes the existence of Native
Hawaiians as a distinct group but only to denominate them as a race
that has benefited from a statutorily enacted racial preference. The
majority re-constructs Native Hawaiians into a race in order to
command that race be excised - that it not be seen. This inverts the
79. Id. at 515.
80. The majority draws on the legislative history of the statute in which the
definitions of Hawaiian and native Hawaiian originally made reference to "any
descendant of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands, previous to 1778." The
substitution of the word "peoples" for "races" was described as merely "technical."
Id. at 515-16. Thus, the Court concludes that the definitions are essentially racial.
81. The proposed statute defined "Hawaiian" as "any descendant of the races
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778." The definition was later changed
by substituting the word "peoples" for "races." Id. at 515-16. The majority reads this
history as an admission that the statutory definitions are racial and an admission by
the state of a racial purpose. Id. at 516-17. But if the group defined is constituted by
members of various "races" it is difficult to see how the definition itself can be
characterized as racially exclusive. The majority here seems to treat the mere
mention of race as an indication that a forbidden classification has been made, in part
because it sees the inquiry into ancestral lines as inherently offensive. Id. at 517. The
assertion that ancestry functions as a proxy for race here then seems to rest on the
contention that ancestral distinctions work the same way and cause the same harms as
race. But of course, the definition of membership in a tribe has also been expressed
in terms of lineal ancestry and we do not understand that definition to be racial simply
because it rests on ancestry. We understand it to be descriptive of an indigenous
people, which is what the statute here was constructed to do.
82. As the dissent argues:
The ability to vote is a function of the lineal descent of a modern-day
resident of Hawaii, not the blood-based characteristics of that resident, or of
the blood-based proximity of that resident to the 'peoples' from whom that
descendant arises. The distinction between ancestry and race is more than
simply one of plain language.
Id. at 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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recognition/de-recognition process in Bakke but achieves the same
effect-the eradication of race and the maintenance of inequality.
Race is transformed into an ethnicity in Bakke; a people bound by
experience and culture is transformed into a race in Rice.' This all
ignores the fact that the framework of the statute in Rice was based on
the need to make restitution to an indigenous people and was part of a
political process of reparations. Race was not a proxy used to target
viewpoint or diversity; ancestral ties were part of defining the group
injured for the purposes of rectifying the group harm. The majority's
failure to grasp the essential difference here lead its to anomalous
results. Under this logic the award of $1.6 billion in reparations to
Japanese-Americans for internment during World War II authorized
by Congress would be subject to attack by a white citizen wrongfully
jailed on charges of treason during the war as an instance of unequal
treatment on the basis of race.
To make matters even more bizarre, the majority opinion cites
without the slightest hint of irony the string of voting rights cases from
the era of racial exclusion and intimidation of Black voters as
testament to the proposition that equality means equal treatment.
Undoubtedly, it is true that to some extent the claims in cases like
Guinn v. United States,'s challenging the grandfather clause, and Terry
83. This is not to deny that common history and culture cannot also be part of the
self-definition of racially subordinated groups. Indeed, the assertion and expression
of that commonality is often of greater significance than the idea of "blood."
Moreover, it is well-known that the lines between race, nation and ethnicity are
notoriously difficult to draw. The point here is that the claims asserted here by native
Hawaiians were grounded in the notion of the historical ties to land, culture and
history, not racial designations. Race is obviously implicated in the discussion
because of the degree to which the conquest of Hawaii was justified as a legitimate
effort to civilize a subordinate race. See Horn & Yamamoto, supra note 65, at 1769
n.105.
84. Justice Stevens' dissent in Adarand predicted that the principle of consistency
would lead to precisely these illogical results:
[C]onsider our cases addressing the Federal Government's discrimination
against Japanese-Americans during World War II.... The discrimination at
issue in those cases was invidious because the Government imposed special
burdens-a curfew and exclusion from certain areas on the West Coast-on
the members of a minority class defined by racial and ethnic characteristics.
Members of the same racially defined class exhibited exceptional heroism in
the service of our country during that War. Now suppose Congress decided
to reward that service with a federal program that gave all JapaneseAmerican veterans an extraordinary preference in Government
employment. If Congress had done so, the same racial characteristics that
motivated the discriminatory burdens in Hirabayashiand Korematsu would
have defined the preferred class of veterans. Nevertheless, "consistency"
surely would not require us to describe the incidental burden on everyone
else in the country as "odious" or "invidious" as those terms were used in
those cases.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
85. 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (holding that exemptions from literacy requirement based
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v. Adams,86 invalidating the whites-only primary system that ensured
that the only candidates on the ballot were white, were framed in
terms that condemned these rules as instances of unequal treatment.
However, the actual gravamen of the complaint was that these lawssome of which accorded nominally equal treatment-were intended to
and in fact did buttress racial exclusion from the political process as
part of a system of racial subordination. Where unequal treatment
was the instrument of injustice, equal treatment was the cure, at least
in part, but it was never the case that these challenges conceived of
equality only in terms of equal treatment. Were the claims of Black
voters reducible to no more than a violation of the principle of equal
treatment, there would be no basis to challenge the most efficient
form of exclusion-facially neutral rules like the grandfather clause.
Indeed, there would be nothing to answer the majority's claim in
Plessy that America's apartheid laws treated Blacks and whites
equally. While Plessy is certainly viewed with disfavor, even by
members of the Court who are staunch supporters of the principle of
equal treatment as equal protection, Plessy survives in the assertion
that equal treatment is the only equal protection concern.
The heirs of Plessy then are Memphis v. Greene' and Palmer v.
Thompson,18 in which racially motivated decisions to close off access
to a public street in the former case and to close public swimming
pools despite a court order to integrate in the latter were deemed not
to offend Equal Protection. This is because in each case the Court
concluded that despite evidence of an illegitimate motive, there was
no unequal treatment of Blacks and whites-all were excluded from
the public swimming pools once they were closed and the street
barrier turned away everyone.8 9 This conception of equality allows
on ancestral ties to those entitled to vote prior to the end of slavery was a violation of
the Fifteenth Amendment).
86. 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (invalidating Texas "Jaybird" primary system which
excluded Blacks).
87. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
88. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
89. In Memphis v. Greene, the barrier was erected at the point of separation of
black and white neighborhoods at the request of white property owners who had
expressed concerns about the influx of "undesirable traffic." 451 U.S. at 115 The
majority found there was no violation of equal protection because it found that the
rationale for the closing-protecting the neighborhood from unwanted traffic was
appropriate. While a benefit had been conferred on white property owners, the only
harm suffered by blacks was a minor inconvenience. Id. at 119. In Palmer v.
Thompson, the city of Jackson, Mississippi was under court order to desegregate all
of its public parks and facilities, and complied with the order excepting for the
swimming pools. The city council ordered the pools closed. The majority decision
rejected the argument that the closure amounted to a violation of equal protection,
because "this is not a case where the whites are permitted to use public facilities while
blacks are denied access." 403 U.S. at 220. The court rendered this finding despite
strong evidence of discriminatory motive; there the mayor had made statements
indicating his hostility to integration. Id. at 250 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting the
newspaper accounts of the mayor's comments that "neither agitators nor President
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the Court to see the closure of the pool and the street as
constitutionally acceptable instances of equal treatment. Ironically,
the psychic and symbolic injury rejected in Memphis and Palmerturns
out to be the precise definition of harm to which the court turns in
Rice; the problem, as Rice sees it, is the message of inequality that the
Hawaiian-only voting scheme conveys." This injury was obvious to
the Court in Rice but invisible to it in Palmer and in Memphis. This is
the inconsistency of the equal treatment principle.
CONCLUSION

The Court-centric focus of this article should not be read to convey
that it is my view that the feat has been accomplished and that the
story is over. Indeed, part of my objective is to put the Supreme
Court majority's reasoning under a microscope in order to expose the
inherent instability in these doctrinal moves. Equal treatment as
equal protection appears to deliver very little either in terms of actual
equality or actual logical consistency. My point is that the path chosen
is not given, inevitable, or inherently "in" the Constitution. Indeed, if
history is any guide (though it may not be much comfort) one thing is
certain: the Court's interpretive stance on equality is contingent and
unstable. No doubt there is little on the horizon that portends a quick
turnaround, but I think it is fair to say that if equal treatment as equal
protection leads the court to decisions like Bush v. Gore,9 in which

counterveiling doctrinal and institutional forces (like the political
question doctrine, standing requirements, and deference to state court
interpretations of state law) were brushed aside, at a minimum the
role and reasoning of the Court will be under some closer scrutiny. It
is my hope that this essay will contribute to that trend and make blind
acceptance of the Court's interpretations less likely.

Kennedy will change the determination of Jackson to retain segregation.").

90. The majority contends that the problem with the Hawaiian-only voting
scheme for OHA is that it conveys the symbolic and demeaning message "that
citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified than others to vote on

certain matters." Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523 (2000). Of course, the
underlying premise is something quite different- not the idea of inequality but of the
need to rectify inequality and oppression.
91. 121 S.Ct. 525 (2000).
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